

# Survey Experiments

POLSCI 4SS3

Winter 2024

# Last week

- We discussed and explored techniques to reduce sensitivity bias
- Some techniques are **observational** (e.g. randomized response)
- Some techniques are **experimental** (e.g. list experiment)
- **Today:** Discuss surveys using experiments more generally

# Survey experiments

# Return to parallels

<b>Theory</b>	<b>Empirics</b>
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Model	Data strategy
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Inquiry	Answer strategy
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<b>Theory</b>	<b>Empirics</b>
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<b>Inquiry</b>	<b>Answer strategy</b>
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# Types of survey research design

## Data strategy

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Inquiry

Observational

Experimental

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Descriptive

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Causal

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## Data strategy

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**Inquiry**

**Observational**

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**Sample survey**

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# Types of survey research design

## Data strategy

**Inquiry**

**Observational**

**Experimental**

**Descriptive**

**Sample survey**

**List experiment**

**Causal**



# Types of survey research design

## Data strategy

	Observational	Experimental
Inquiry		
Descriptive	Sample survey	List experiment
Causal	Panel survey	

# Types of survey research design

	Data strategy	
Inquiry	Observational	Experimental
Descriptive	Sample survey	List experiment
Causal	Panel survey	Survey experiment

Survey experiments are **experimental** data strategies that answer a **causal** inquiry

# Survey experiments

- Assign respondents to **conditions** or **treatments**
- Usually by **random assignment**
- Each condition is a different version of a **question** or **vignette**
- **Goal:** Understand the effect of different conditions on the outcome question of interest
- How does this work?

# Taking a step back

- Two ways to express functional relations in a **model**
  1. Structural causal models
  2. Potential outcomes framework

# Taking a step back

- Two ways to express functional relations in a **model**
  1. Structural causal models
  2. **Potential outcomes framework**

# Potential outcomes framework

# Notation

- $i$ : unit of analysis (e.g. individuals, schools, countries)
- $Z_i = \{0, 1\}$  indicates a condition (1: Treatment, 0: Control)
- $Y_i(Z_i)$  is the individual **potential outcome**
- $Y_i(0)$ : Potential outcome under control
- $Y_i(1)$ : Potential outcome under treatment

# Toy example

ID	Female	$Y_i(1)$	$Y_i(0)$
1	0	0	0
2	0	1	0
3	1	1	0
4	1	1	1

- $\tau_i = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$  is the individual causal effect



# Toy example

ID	Female	$Y_i(1)$	$Y_i(0)$	$\tau_i$
1	0	0	0	0
2	0	1	0	1
3	1	1	0	1
4	1	1	1	0

- $\tau_i = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$  is the **individual causal effect**
- $\tau = (1/n) \sum_{i=1}^n \tau_i = E[\tau_i]$  is the **inquiry or estimand**
- We call  $\tau$  the **Average Treatment Effect (ATE)**

# Notation chart

## Greek

- Letters like  $\mu$  denote **estimands**
- A hat  $\hat{\mu}$  denotes **estimators**

## Latin

- Letters like  $X$  denote **actual variables** in our data
- A bar  $\bar{X}$  denotes an **estimate** calculated from our data

$$X \rightarrow \bar{X} \rightarrow \hat{\mu} \xrightarrow{\text{hopefully!}} \mu$$

$$\text{Data} \rightarrow \text{Estimate} \rightarrow \text{Estimator} \xrightarrow{\text{hopefully!}} \text{Estimand}$$

# Challenge

- We want to know the ATE  $\tau$
- This requires us to know  $\tau_i = Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$
- But when we assign treatment conditions we only observe one of the potential outcomes  $Y_i(1)$  or  $Y_i(0)$
- Meaning that  $\tau_i$  is impossible to calculate!
- This is the **fundamental problem of causal inference**

# Continuing the example

ID	Female	Unobserved		$\tau_i$
		$Y_i(1)$	$Y_i(0)$	
1	0	0	0	0
2	0	1	0	1
3	1	1	0	1
4	1	1	1	0

- We can randomly assign conditions  $Z_i$

# Continuing the example

ID	Female	Unobserved			Observed	
		$Y_i(1)$	$Y_i(0)$	$\tau_i$	$Z_i$	$Y_i$
1	0	0	0	0	1	0
2	0	1	0	1	0	0
3	1	1	0	1	1	1
4	1	1	1	0	0	1

- We observe outcome  $Y_i$  depending on assigned condition  $Z_i$
- We can use this to approximate the ATE with an **estimator**

# Estimator for the ATE

- Additive property of expectations:

$$\begin{aligned}\tau &= E[\tau_i] = E[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)] \\ &= \underbrace{E[Y_i(1)] - E[Y_i(0)]}_{\text{Difference in means between potential outcomes}}\end{aligned}$$

- We cannot calculate this, but we can calculate

$$\hat{\tau} = \underbrace{E[Y_i(1)|Z_i = 1] - E[Y_i(0)|Z_i = 0]}_{\text{Difference in means between conditions}}$$

# Randomization

- If we can claim that units are selected into conditions  $Z_i$  independently from potential outcomes
- Then we can claim that  $\hat{\tau}$  is a *valid* approximation of  $\tau$
- In which case we say that  $\hat{\tau}$  is an **unbiased** estimator of the ATE
- Random assignment of units into conditions guarantees this *in expectation*

# Discussion



# Tomz and Weeks (2013): “Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace”

- Surveys in the UK ( $n = 762$ ) and US ( $n = 1273$ )
- April-May 2010
- **Outcome:** Support for military strike
- 2x2x2 survey experiment

# Vignette design

## UK

- **Political regime:**  
Democracy/not a democracy
- **Military alliances:** Ally/not an ally
- **Military power:** As strong/half as strong

## US

- **Political regime:**  
Democracy/not a democracy
- **Military alliances:** Ally/not an ally
- **Trade:** High level/not high level

# Results for democracy

**TABLE 1. The Effect of Democracy on Willingness to Strike**

	United Kingdom (between)	United States (between)	United States (within)
Not a democracy	34.2	53.3	50.0
Democracy	20.9	41.9	38.5
Effect of democracy	-13.3	-11.4	-11.5
95% C.I.	(-19.6 to -6.9)	(-17.0 to -5.9)	(-14.7 to -8.3)

# Results for other factors

**TABLE 2. The Effect of Alliances, Power, and Trade**

	United Kingdom	United States
No military alliance	30.7	50.2
Military alliance	25.1	45.1
<i>Effect of alliance</i>	-5.7	-5.1
<i>95% C.I.</i>	(-12.0 to 0.6)	(-10.7 to 0.5)
Half as strong	29.3	
As strong	26.3	
<i>Effect of strength</i>	-3.0	
<i>95% C.I.</i>	(-9.4 to 3.2)	
No high trade		50.3
High trade		45.1
<i>Effect of high trade</i>		-5.2
<i>95% C.I.</i>		(-10.6 to 0.2)

# Eggers et al (2017): “Corruption, Accountability, and Gender”

## Constituency A

This is a marginal constituency won narrowly by the **Conservatives** at the last election. Based on polls, the **only other party with a chance of winning this seat** are **Labour**. Here are the details of the current **Conservative MP** and the **Labour** challenger:

Current MP:



Conservative  
64 years old  
Female  
Formerly a business manager

Main challenger:



Labour  
62 years old  
Female  
Formerly a business manager

Last year, the current MP was found to have **inappropriately claimed over £10,000** on expenses.


If you were living in this constituency at the next general election, who would you vote for?

- The current Conservative MP
- The Labour challenger
- The Liberal Democrat candidate
- A candidate from another party
- No one, I would not vote

# Profile variants

Factor	MP	Challenger
Party	Labour, Conservative	Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat
Age	45, 52, 64	40, 52, 64
Gender	Male, Female	Male, Female
Previous job	General practitioner, journalist, political advisor, teacher, business manager	General practitioner, journalist, political advisor, teacher, business manager

# Results



# **Next Week**

## **Convenience Samples**

**Focus on: Should findings generalize?**



**Break time!**





Lab

